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Abstract—In conventional wireless networks, security issues are pri-
marily considered above the physical layer and are usually based on bit-
level algorithms to establish the identity of a legitimate wireless device.
Physical layer security is a new paradigm in which features extracted
from an analog signal can be used to establish the unique identity of
a transmitter. Our previous research work into RF fingerprinting has
shown that every transmitter has a unique RF fingerprint owing to
imperfections in the analog components present in the RF front end.
Generally, it is believed that the RF fingerprint of a specific transmitter
is same across all receivers. That is, a fingerprint created in one receiver
can be transported to another receiver to establish the identity of a
transmitter. However, to the best of the author’s knowledge, no such
example is available in the literature in which an RF fingerprint generated
in one receiver is used for identification in other receivers. This paper
presents the results of experiments, and analyzing the feasibility of using
an universal RF fingerprint of a transmitter for identification across
different receivers.
Index Terms—Physical Layer Security, Radio Fingerprinting, USRP,
Radiometric signature
I. INTRODUCTION
The continued proliferation of inexpensive wireless Radio Fre-
quency (RF) devices provides worldwide communication connectiv-
ity to virtually every individual. These wireless devices broadcast
information to intended recipients in the form of an electromagnetic
emission. Due to broadcast nature of wireless communication, the
unintended recipient may simply listen to the communication activity
and remain passive – an activity that is difficult to detect – or may
become active and compromise the identity of the wireless device by
launching “spoofing” or “man in the middle” type attacks [1]. Much
of the current research is focused on traditional bit-level algorithmic
approaches to improving network security and mitigating spoofing
attacks. However, the security algorithm would be compromised upon
access to the key, thus making it difficult to distinguish between a
legitimate and a cloned key/device [2]. For example, the Medium
Access Control (MAC) address of a network interface card can
be changed in software [3]. The Electronic Serial Number (ESN)
and Mobile Identification Number (MIN) of a cellular phone can
be changed by replacing the Erasable Programmable Read Only
Memory (EPROM), hence allowing a modification of its identity [4].
Additionally, higher-layer security key distribution and management
may be difficult to implement and may be vulnerable to attacks in
some environments, such as ad hoc or relay networks, in which
transceivers may join or leave randomly [5, 6]. Furthermore, some re-
cent wireless technologies do not allow an interactive communication
for establishing a cryptography key owing to their unique architecture.
One such example is a Cognitive Radio Network (CRN), which was
invented in order to increase the efficiency of spectrum usage. If a
Primary User Emulation (PUE) attack is launched then the whole
operation of CRN is jeopardized by effectively limiting the access of
legitimate users to idle spectrum [7]. Thus the compromised identity
of wireless devices creates vulnerability to a variety of attacks, which
can take the form of impersonation, intrusion, theft of bandwidth and
denial of service.
More recently, consideration has been given to detecting and
mitigating spoofing near or at the bottom of the Open Systems
Interconnection (OSI) network stack. One such work includes the
addition of a “lightweight security layer” hosted within the MAC
layer to detect spoofing and anomalous traffic [8]. Other recent efforts
have focused on Physical (PHY) layer implementations with the goal
of exploiting RF characteristics (radio and environmental) that are
difficult to mimic, thus minimizing opportunities for spoofing. Hence,
identity theft can be effectively tackled using physical layer security.
Physical layer security is a new concept for securing the identity
of wireless devices by extracting the unique features embedded
in the electromagnetic waves emitted by the transmitters [9, 10].
These unique features arises due to the modulation errors from
the modulator, phase noise from oscillators, spurious tones from
mixers and Power Amplifiers (PA), non-linearity distortion from PAs,
power ramp distortions (which are associated with the transients),
and distortion of the equivalent filter in the path from the digital
module to the antenna (including the analog Intermediate Frequency
(IF) filters and RF filters) and from various analog components in
the transmission chain [11]. Physical layer security that is based on
recognizing these unique features is known as Radio Frequency (RF)
fingerprinting [12]. The results published in our previous research
work have shown that similar transmitters (same manufacturer and
model) can have different RF fingerprint, which helps in identification
[13–15]. This paper further investigates into the portability of an
RF fingerprint across different receivers. The portability of an RF
fingerprint can have different applications such as enabling regulatory
authorities to identify a wireless intruder/interferer in a network and
enable policing of the wireless spectrum through identification of
illegal wireless transmitters.
The main contribution of this paper is an investigation into the
portability of an RF fingerprint across different receivers in two
scenarios, namely (1) infrastructure and (2) ad hoc wireless network.
In the infrastructure scenario, a high-end receiver was used for
generating profile RF fingerprints of transmitters whereas in the ad
hoc scenario, profile RF fingerprints were generated using low-end
receivers. These profile RF fingerprints were used for identification
in the low-end receivers. In this paper, “high-end receiver” means a
receiver front-end built with high quality analog components, which
can cost up to thousands of dollars. A “low-end receiver” means a
receiver front-end built with inexpensive analog components, which
might cost no more than a few hundred dollars.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II describes
the experimental setup, including preamble/ feature extraction and
data collection. Section III explains the classification process used
in this paper. Section IV discusses performance evaluations for
infrastructure and Ad hoc scenarios. Section V concludes the paper
with a summary and identifies avenues for future research.
Figure 1: Overall RF fingerprinting analysis process for preamble sig-
nal generation, transmission/reception, SNR analysis, RF fingerprint
creation and classification.
II. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
Figure 2 shows the overall experimental setup that was used
for collecting the data from different transmitters and receivers.
The red and blue dashed boundaries show the processes that were
implemented in hardware and in software, respectively. An IEEE
802.11a/g standard preamble signal was generated in MATLAB
and transmitted from the seven different USRP transmitters. The
preamble signal was then captured with eight different receivers.
The complex In-phase (I) and Quadrature (Q) signal components
from different receivers were stored in a computer. The preambles
were extracted from the I and Q components of the signals. The
RF fingerprinting was analysed for varying Signal to Noise Ratios
(SNR) that exists in a typical operational environment. The SNR
was analysed by adding a power-scaled, random, complex Additive
White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) to the preamble signal. The Power
Spectral Density (PSD) coefficients were extracted from the noisy
preamble signals to form the RF fingerprint for each transmitter;
classification was then performed using a classifier. The details
of the hardwares, experimental setup, preamble extraction and RF
fingerprints formation can be found in our previous published works
[14–17]. Data collection and classification process is explained in
next subsection.
A. Data collection
Each 802.11a/g RF burst starts with a preamble signal . The
preamble signal is made up of a fixed training sequence, which is
used for timing/ frequency acquisition, diversity selection and channel
estimation. The IEEE 802.11a/g preamble signal is 16 microseconds
long and consists of 10 short and 2 long training sequences [18].
Seven SBX daughter boards are used as low-end transmitter and
receiver as explained in [15]. A total of 10,000 signals from each
transmitter were captured and stored at each of the receivers, giving
a total data set of 490,000 received signals.
III. CLASSIFICATION PROCESS
The RF fingerprinting process consists of two phases: namely train-
ing and testing. In the training phase, a specific transmitter’s signals
were used to create the profile RF fingerprint for that transmitter.
Whereas in the testing phase, an RF fingerprint was created from an
input test signal. Then a trained classifier was used to classify this
Table I: Confusion matrix for a system trained with high-end
receivers signals. The confusion matrix is obtained for signals
collected at 15 dB SNR. The confusion matrix shows predictions
in percentage.
(a) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 7
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0.1 0 0.1 0 99.7 0
Tx2 0 0 2.5 0.3 96.8 0.1
Tx3 0 0.2 0.1 0 99.6 0
Tx4 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 99.2 0
Tx5 0.1 0.7 0.4 0.1 98 0.4
Tx6 0 0.1 0.3 0 99.3 0.1
test RF fingerprint against the existing profiles of the transmitter. The
RF fingerprinting computational complexity is largely dependent on
the RF feature extraction technique. Our technique involves two steps
in creating the RF fingerprint from a received signal: a) extracting the
signal of interest (i.e., preamble); b) creating the RF fingerprint from
PSD coefficients. The PSD coefficients are calculated using the Fast
Fourier Transform (FFT), which is computationally inexpensive and
can be implemented using today’s low power DSP chips [19, 20].
Once an RF fingerprint is created then the rest of computational
complexity is dependent on the classifier. A commonly used Multi-
Layer Perceptron (MLP) neural network was used for identification
in this research work [21, 22], although other simpler classifiers like
K-Nearest Neigbor (KNN) can be used, which we have demonstrated
in our previous work [14, 15]. In both the scenarios, the K-fold cross
validation technique was used for assessing the overall performance.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In this paper an infrastructure network refers to a wireless network,
in which all of the wireless devices report to the central node in
order to establish a communication link. A cellular phone network
is a typical example, in which a central base station disseminates
information to the cellular phones. The central node is assumed to
be a highly specialized node with a high-end receiver front end. The
central node performs training in order to create a profile fingerprint
of each the transmitter. Then these profiles are distributed to the low-
end wireless devices through a secure channel. The following is the
rationale for creating a profile RF fingerprint in a high-end receiver
• First, the front-end of low-end devices are built with imperfect
analog components, which are unable to create unique profile
RF fingerprints of transmitters. Therefore, the burden of creating
the profile RF fingerprint is left to the central node, which is
equipped with a specialized receiver.
• Second, the central node keeps a record of the profile RF finger-
prints of all the transmitters with whom it has communicated.
If a wireless node behaves suspiciously or an interfering node
appears in the network then the central node can disseminate
the profile RF fingerprints of the problematic node to the other
low-end devices, which can then take action to thwart the effects
of the problem node.
In this paper an ad hoc network refers to a wireless network, in which
all of the wireless nodes have the same specifications. An ad hoc
wireless network is formed without the presence of a central node.
In an ad hoc network, it is assumed that all the wireless devices are
equipped with a front end built with inexpensive analog components.
Table II: Confusion matrix for a system trained with high-end receivers signals. The confusion matrix is obtained for signals collected
at 15 dB SNR. The confusion matrix shows predictions in percentage.
(a) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 1
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx2 0.2 0 5.8 0.1 0.2 93.3
Tx3 1 0 2.8 0.1 0.2 95.6
Tx4 0.3 0 0.4 0.2 0.2 98.6
Tx5 0.3 0 0.2 0.2 0.1 98.9
Tx6 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.8
Tx7 0 0 0 0 0 99.8
(b) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 2
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 1.5 0 98.4
Tx3 0 0 0.1 2.3 0 97.3
Tx4 0 0 0.19 1.7 0 97.9
Tx5 0 0 0 1.7 0 98.2
Tx6 0 0 0.1 1.4 0.1 98.2
Tx7 0 0 0 0.8 0.1 98.9
(c) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 3
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx4 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0.7 0 99.2
Tx2 0 0 0.1 0.7 0 99
Tx4 0 0.1 0.1 1 0 98.6
Tx5 0 0 0 0.6 0 99.2
Tx6 0 0.3 0.2 1.8 0.1 97.3
Tx7 0 0.1 0 0.9 0 98.8
(d) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 4
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx5 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx2 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx3 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx5 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx6 0 0 0 0.1 0 99.8
Tx7 0 0 0 0.9 0 98.9
(e) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 5
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx6 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx2 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx3 0 0 0 0 0.2 99.6
Tx4 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.7
Tx6 0 0 0 0 0 100
Tx7 0 0 0 0 0.1 99.8
(f) Testing using signals received with low-end Rx 6
Predicted Class of transmitters
Tx1 Tx2 Tx3 Tx4 Tx5 Tx7
A
ct
u
al
C
la
ss
Tx1 0 0 0 0 0 99.9
Tx2 0 0 0 0.1 0 99.8
Tx3 0.1 0.1 0 0.4 0.7 98.3
Tx4 0.2 0.3 0 0.5 0.3 98.3
Tx5 0 0.4 0 0.7 0.7 98
Tx7 0 0 0 0 0 99.8
Every low-end receiver implements training and creates a profile RF
fingerprint of the wireless devices in the ad hoc wireless network
because there is no specialized centralized node. Once a profile is
created, it is tested by matching the RF fingerprint of a received
signal against the already stored profiles. If a match is found then a
wireless device is considered to be a legal transmitter; otherwise it
is considered to be an attacker.
In both scenarios, the profile RF fingerprint of wireless devices
can be created during the initialization phase of a wireless network
such as LTE, IEEE 802.16 [23], IEEE 802.11 [18] and IEEE 802.22
[24]. The initialization phase involves registration, key exchange
and synchronization of wireless devices [24–26]. This sequence
of requests and responses provides an opportunity to create the
profile RF fingerprint of legitimate wireless devices. Later on, if an
impersonation attack is launched, then the attacker’s RF fingerprints
are checked against the existing RF fingerprint profiles of users stored
in the low-end devices. If a match is not found then it would be
identified as being an impersonation attack.
A. Scenario 1: - Infrastructure Wireless Radio Network
In this scenario, the high-end receiver acts as a specialized central
radio node and the profile RF fingerprints of the seven transmitters are
created with the preamble signals collected by the high-end receiver.
Signals captured from all seven transmitters by the low-end receivers
are used for testing the effectiveness of the fingerprinting scheme.
Tables 1 and 2 show the confusion matrix at 15 dB SNR for
seven low-end receivers. Table 2 shows that each low-end receiver
(from 1 to 6) incorrectly identifies all transmitters as Tx7. Low-end
receiver Rx7 incorrectly identifies all transmitters as Tx5. In other
words, the low-end receivers cannot rely on the profile fingerprints
recorded by the high-end receiver because the low-end receivers
(and their impairments) create fingerprints different from those of
the high-end receiver. Figure 2 illustrates how different the high-
end fingerprint of a transmitters is from the low-end fingerprints of
the same transmitters. Such differences make accurate classification
unlikely.
The RF fingerprint created with a high-end receiver cannot be
reliably transferred to a low-end receiver without compensating for
the imperfections of the receivers. The results suggest that, because
of their imperfections, every receiver forms a different RF fingerprint
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(a) Tx1 fingerprint features across receivers
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(b) Tx2 fingerprint features across receivers
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(c) Tx3 fingerprint features across receivers
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(d) Tx4 fingerprint features across receivers
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(e) Tx5 fingerprint features across receivers
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(f) Tx6 fingerprint features across receivers
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(g) Tx7 fingerprint features across receivers
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Figure 2: Receivers create different RF fingerprints for the same set of transmitters at 15dB SNR. In the feature space, the RF fingerprint
created by the high-end receiver is far away from the fingerprint created by the low-end receivers. Note that the USRP daughterboards have
different chains for transmission and reception [27]. In order to avoid any commonalities between the transmit and receive chains, either the
transmit chain or the receive chain of a daughterboard was used; both were not used at the same time (e.g. when Rx1 was used for capturing
the transmitter signals, Tx1 was not captured as it was implemented on the same daughterboard).
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Figure 3: Profile RF fingerprint of transmitters are generated with the signals captured by Rx 6 and testing is performed with signals captured
by other receivers.
for the same transmitter, so the RF fingerprints generated in a
single receiver cannot be used as a universal RF fingerprint of the
transmitter. If a legitimate transmitter fingerprint created with a high-
end receiver is used for identification in a low-end receiver then the
low-end receiver would be likely to identify the legitimate transmitter
as malicious. This implies that RF fingerprinting is not a viable option
for mitigating impersonation attacks in an infrastructure wireless
network, in which a profile RF fingerprint is created with a high-
end receiver different from the one being used for testing.
B. Scenario 2: - Ad hoc Wireless Network
In the ad hoc wireless network analysis, the profile RF fingerprints
of seven transmitters were created with signals captured by low-
end receivers and tested also with low-end receiver signals. In the
analysis, simulated Additive White Gaussian Noise (AWGN) was
added to the collected signals in order to assess the effect of SNR.
Figure 2 shows that every low-end receiver forms its own RF
fingerprint from the received signal of the same transmitter. To
investigate further that the RF fingerprint of a specific transmitter
varies across all receivers or it is limited to a specific receiver, we
trained our MLP neural network with the signals captured by one
low-end receiver and tested with the signals captured by the other
receivers. For example, the profile RF fingerprints of Tx2 to Tx7
were created with the signals captured by Rx1, then tested using the
signals from the same transmitters but captured by the other receivers.
The classification accuracy is plotted in Figure 3, which is for the
profile RF fingerprint generated from the receiver Rx6 signals and
tested using the signals captured by all of the other receivers. The
True Acceptance rate for different transmitters showed that correct
identification decreased when the profile fingerprint generated with a
different receiver was used for identification. This shows that every
receiver forms a different RF fingerprint for the same transmitter
irrespective of the receiver type (high or low-end). This implies that
the RF fingerprint of a transmitter is not portable across receivers.
Similar results were obtained for all other receivers but only one is
presented here due to the space limitation.
V. SUMMARY
The RF fingerprint of a specific transmitter varies across the
receivers due to its front-end, which makes the portability of an
RF fingerprint difficult. The experimental results show that the RF
fingerprint created with a specific receiver (either a high-end or a
low-end) cannot be used as a universal profile RF fingerprint of a
specific transmitter across different receivers. If a low-end receiver
uses profile fingerprints created using any other receiver (high or
low-end alike), it is likely that the low-end receiver will misclassify
transmitters. Future work will further explore the effect of channel
and high-end hardware on the portability of the RF fingerprinting.
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